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Given the current state of the
agricultural economy, many farmers
and other rural people are concerned
about the continuing farm financial
distress and the impact of these condi
tions on rural communities. As a result,
many people are interested in (1)
studying the nature and scope of the
current situation and (2) defining the
proper role of the Federal Governmait in
dealing with the present problems. This
newsletter explores the farm credit
conditions and the public policy choices
available.
Who are the farm borrowers?
Today's farmers are a diverse breed and
not all have the same perceived problems
or financial circumstances. Only one
fifth are high debt operators and one
quarter are moderate debt farmers. The
remaining 58/5 are equity financed. So
only a minority are financially at risk
(see Table 1).
Table 1 Farm Financial Position by Sales Class, 1962
Annual Sales
Class.
Percent
of all
Farms
Percent
of
Agricultural
Sales
Percent
of
Production
Expenses
Percent
with
High
Debt^
Percent
with
Low
Debt°
<200,000 A over 5'' 49 40 44 20
$MO,00-$200,000 24 33 39 31 34
less than $40,000 71 13 21 14 67
All Fanns 100 100 100 18 58
®End of Year 1982 fa.'-ms with a debt/asset ratio greater than ^10 percent.
^End of year 1932 farms with a debt/asset ratio less than 10 percent.
1. Econocilc Indicators of the Farm Sector, USDA/ESIFS 1-1, Table
50, August 1952.
2. Baanuel Melichar, "Farm Profits and Financial Distress"
Workshop on Q-edit and.Tax Policies for the Fsnily "arm,
Oanraittee on Snail Eusiness, U.S. Senate, Apr. 27, 1933.
However, the financial conditions
vary by sales class. The largest com
mercial farms with annual gross sales
over $200,000 per farm represent less
than -^lo of the farms, but account for
half of total agricultural sales, 40% of
input purchases, and nearly 40% of both'
farm debt and farm assets. Compared to
other sales classes, this group has the
highest percentage of farmers who are at
risk financially (44%) and the lowest
percentage of equity financed farmers
viio borrow very little.
The moderate size farms with annual
sales of $40,000 to $200,000 represent'
one quarter of the farms and approxi
mately 40% of the sales, production
expenses, outstanding farm debt and farm
assets. In this group, roughly one-third
are high debt operators, one-third are
equity financed farmers and the re-,
maining third have moderate debt/asset
ratios.
The small farms with annual sales
less than $40,000 represent 71% of all
farms but account for only 13% of sales,
and approximately 20% of production
expenses, farm debt and farm assets.
This group includes many different
types. Income data indicate that most
of these farmers rely on non farm incane
as the' major source of family income.
Age data also indicate that'this sales
class has a higher proportion of retired
farm and non farm operators. As a
result, the small farm sales class has
the highest proportion of equity
financed farmers (67^) and the lowest
proportion of high debt farmers. (14%)
compared to the other sales classes.
However, because this sales class is the
largest group of farmers, in actual
nunbers over half of the total high debt
operators for all classes are small
farmers. These are likely to be young,
full and part-time farmers with low
resources and low family income.
Who are the farm lenders? At the
close of 1982, there was nearly $218
billion in outstanding farm debt. This
is up $15 billion or 7-9% over the end
of 1981 and is double the amount of farm
debt in 1976. Half of the outstanding
debt was in real estate loans and half
in operating loans.
Tine Farm Credit System was the
largest lender with nearly a third of
the outstanding farm debt (see Table
2). Individual lenders and banks each
represented slightly more than one-fifth
of the credit. The Farmers Hane Admin
istration—Wiich is the federal agency
lender of last resort—accounted for
11%.
Table 2. U.S. Farm Debt, OutstancJing End of Tear 1982
Lending Institution
Farm Credit System^
Individuals and Others
All Operating Sanks
Fanners Kcr.e Adn.
Conisodity O-eJit Corp.
Life Insurance Cos.
Total
End of Year Debt Oiange During Year
bil.dol percent bLl.doI . percent
68.1 31-3 2.5 u.o
51.5 23.7 .9 1.9
44.8 20.6 3.4 3.3
23.8 11.0 .6 2.8
16.6 7.6 3.6 107.3
12.3 5.9 -.3 -2.3
217.7 100.0 16.0 7-9
^InclLries farm operatiog and real estate loans made by the Federal land
Banks, Production Credit Associations and participating Federal
Intermediate Credit Benks. Tne Farm Credit System institutions are
borrower-ovned cooperative lending agencies that receive no federal
• appropriations for lending purposes.
Source: Agricultural Finance Dita Book. Board of Governors,
Fe-ieral Tteserve System, Uishington, CC, March 1933.
Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC)
and life insurance companies each repre
sented less than a tenth of the out
standing farm loans. However, the CCC
loan volume more than doubled during
1982. In addition to CCC credit growth,
bank credit also increased at a faster
pace than the increase in total farm
debt during 1982. The life insurance
companies was the only lender group to
reduce the actual dollars loaned in farm
credit during the year.
How much federally subsidized
credit should be given? The Farmers
Home Administration (FmHA) provides
grants, insured loans, loan guarantees
and interest subsidies for qualifying
businesses, conmunities, and farm opera
tors who are unable to secure credit
elseviiiere. Farm loans have accounted
for about one-third of total FmHA loan
volume in recent years.
FmHA's market share of total farm
debt has doubled in the past decade from
6% to 12% (see Table 3)- While the FmHA
T«bl» 3. fariBcrj HomeAdainljtrAtlon Far* Ofbl Statistics, 1971-03.
1971
n
"TiamTcTr. rercTt»l*'or'Torri TSUR TeFcVnl oTTol.
Real Fslate Noo Real Estate Real Estate Real Estate
9.0
11.0
14.5
15.0
z.a
?.6
?.6
4.2
. 11.2
13.6
15.0
14.3
2.6
2.8
3.0
3.2
3.4
3.7
7.1
7.7
8.7
0.1
8.1
7.2
6.6
6.6
6.3
8.3
7.9
Source: USDA, Agricultural Finance Outloolt an<l Situation, Dec. 1902.
""Total Percent of
rmllA Total
Farm Debt Farm Debt
»il. (Tol.I
3.2
3.4
3.6
3.9
4.3
5.1
5.5
7.1
9.9 .
16.1
19.5
23.2
23.7
5.7
5.6
5.2
5.6
5.3
5.8
7.0
9.7
10.7
11.5
n.o
share of farm real estate debt has re
mained relatively constant during this
period, the FmHA share of the non-real
estate farm loans has quadrupled. This
trend raises the fundamental question
of whether the level of subsidized
credit should be changed.
What are the FmHA criteria? To be
a FmHA borrower, one must (1) be unable
to obtain credit elsewhere, (2) be a
U.S. citizen, (3) have sufficient
training and experience, and (4) be or
become a not-larger-than-family farm
operator. After these initial criteria
are met, FmHA loan approval is based on
additional criteria that includes repay
ment ability, adequate security,
soundness of the Farm and Home Plan, and
suitability of the farm.
As the lender of last resort,
FmHA's security requirements are more
flexible than those offered by commer
cial lenders. As a general rule, farm
ownership loans are secured by real
estate and chattel mortgages. On farm
operating loans, FmHA will have a first
lien on production and will require
chattel and/or real estate security. If
security is inadequate, FmHA must consi
der repayment ability. Oi emergency
loans, FmHA will accept real estate or
chattel security. Again if security is
inadequate due to disaster or economic
emergency, FmHA considers repayment
ability.
Repayment ability is calculated on
the Farm and Home Plan. It is deter
mined by comparing an expected cash
balance available for debt payment and
the schedule of planned principal and
Interest payments. The appraisal of the
cash balance for debt payment is an
estimate of receipts minus expenses and
by nature is not entirely an objective
process. This leaves some room for
negotiation.
Farms v^ich are low-producing
because of a "lack of developnent" and
who fail to meet the regular FmHA
interest repayment ability criteria
are eligible for substantially reduced
limited-resource loan interest rates. By,
law, at least 20% of FmHA's farm
ownership operating loan funds are to
go to qualifying limited-resource bor
rowers. Presently limited-resource loan
authority has gone unused due to lack of
limited resource applicants. Che reason
may be a lack of awareness and knowledge
by borrowers in sane states that the
program exists.
Who should receive subsidized
credit? There are many options, in
cluding one or a combination of the
following: (1) no., one, (2) young
farmers, (3) low resource farmers, (4)
minority farmers, (5) family farmers,
(6) those impacted by acute natural
disasters, (7) those impacted by
chronic adverse, weather, (8) those
impacted by economic onergencies, (9)
those vho are creditworthy, and (10)
all who apply. The debate has centered
on whether the governmait's role is to
provide "development assistance", "eco
nomic emergency assistance" or some
combination.
Should those who are not born with
a "silver spoon" receive credit assis
tance or should farming be left to those
vho were born with the ready-made oppor
tunity to farm? Farm structure is
influenced by technological advances and
the policy environment. If the farm
credit policy objective is to foster
those who initially lack resources to
start farming, then subsidized credit
should be targeted toward minority and
young, low resource farmers.
Loan limits are probably the" most
effective tool for targeting loans to
small family farms and limited resource
borrowers. However, the average FmHA
Operating Loan (OL) is about $30,000
while the OL limit is $100,000. There
fore, only a few borrowers would likely
be affected by raising the limits on
FmHA loan programs, even though these
limits have been in effect for seme
time.
If the farm credit policy objective
is to provide econonic emergency relief
for the farmers v^no produce most of the
food and ,for private lending institu
tions v^o hold most of the farm debt,
then the subsidized credit should be
targeted toward the high debt commercial
farmers who hold the largest portion of
private farm debt. However, a nunber of
these farmers financially leveraged
their businesses to expand during the
1970's and. are now financially at risk
under current economic conditions.
Should these farmers be rewarded with
subsidized credit since their expecta
tions exceeded their farm profits and
capital gains?
Present FmHA policy is to provide
credit to those iniio can develop a farm
plan that is able to meet cash flow loan
payments from annual projected cash
balances. To a degree, current policy
cuts across both structural and economic
emergency objectives.,
Wfiat is the appropriate action for
those in financial difficulty? Last
year, the actual FmHA failure rate from
voluntary liquidations, foreclosures and
bankruptcies was 2.97o of 270,000
borrowers. However, about 28% of FmHA
borrowers were delinquent on' payments.
Those requiring special assistance
actions were up substantially during the
first six months of this fiscal year
compared to last.
In 1982, the delinquency rates for
other, financial institutions were 3.2%
for the Federal Land Banks, 3.3% for the
Production Credit Associations and about
4% for carmercial bank farm loans. The
Farm Credit System foreclosure auctions
in 1982 were 385 (less than one tenth of
one percent) for the Federal Land Banks
and 870 (less than three tenths of one
percent) for the PCA's. All 1982 rates
were up over 198I.
Many people have becone concerned
about appropriate remedies for those in
financial difficulty,. Present FmHA
remedies for those borrowers who are
delinquent and/or in default include (1)
consolidation of new and old loans, (2)
rescheduling payments out over a longer
anoritization period, (3) deferral of
interest and principal payments to be
made up later with interest, (4) volun
tary liquidation of some assets and
foreclosure. The use of a particular
tool depends upon the severity of the
.circumstances and the estimated repay
ment ability of the borrower.
Recently, other rsnedies have been
proposed. A "moratorium" implies an
alternative FmHA policy for loan
deferrals and rescheduling of payments,
presunably designed to partially
forgive: (1) interest on any deferred
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